| FOIS 2006 | START Conference Manager |
The gene ontology captures information at a very small scale, namely: molecular function, biological process, and cellular components. At this level, the gene ontology should be capable of developing a semantics for every relation of genomic data to protein synthesis to the biological processes which result. In essence, the gene ontology should be able to describe the complete biomechanical functioning of an organism. But what of the social ontological statuses of organisms, and the relations of individuals to the higher level functions? Can the gene ontology account for higher level activities of an organism (such as intentionality, rights, property relations, etc.), assuming they are naturalistically based on biological processes? Without leaping to conclusions about whether higher level functions are in fact naturalistically based, we should develop a semantics to serve as a hypothetical bridge should genomics lead us in that direction. It makes no sense yet to uncouple higher level biological processes and social processes from a genetic base, and developing a bridge ontology could help us discuss and capture ontologies of legal, social and ethical use.
One place to start is the relation between genomic data and the individual organism. Does genomic data completely describe an individual, with the semantics of the existing gene ontology, or do we need to add levels of functional description of a higher order? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for completely describing an individual, living organism and does the gene ontology capture those conditions, even assuming a naturalistic theory of organism?
| START Conference Manager (V2.52.9) |
| Maintainer: rrgerber@softconf.com |